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Abstract 
A widespread objection to research on scientific discovery is that there has been a noticeable 
dearth of significant novel findings in domain sciences contributed by machine discovery programs. 
The implication is that the essential parts of the discovery process are not captured by these 
programs. The aim of this note is to document for the AI audience a novel finding in particle 
physics that was enabled by the machine discovery program PAUL1 reported previously. This 
finding consists of a theorem that expresses the minimum number of conservation laws that are 
needed, mathematically speaking, to account for any consistent experimental data on particle 
reactions. This note also reports how a puzzle raised by the theorem-its conflict with physics 
practice-is resolved. 
1. Introduction 
A widespread objection to research on computational scientific discovery is that there 
has been a noticeable dearth of significant novel findings in domain sciences contributed 
by discovery programs. The implication is that the essential parts of the discovery 
process are not captured by these programs. If this implication is true, then the whole 
automated scientific discovery enterprise is so far of doubtful soundness. Of even wider 
consequence is that the theory of heuristic search is seriously incomplete, since it fails 
to account for a salient aspect of human reasoning: discovery in science. Therefore, it 
becomes critical to record instances of novel machine discovery in order to falsify the 
premise that underlies this serious implication, i.e., the premise that discovery programs 
have enabled no significant new discoveries. 
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The aim of this note is to document for the AI audience a novel finding in particle 
physics that was enabled by the machine discovery program PAUL1 reported previously 
[ 41. This finding consists of a theorem that expresses the minimum number of con- 
servation laws that are needed, mathematically speaking, to account for any consistent 
experimental data on particle reactions. 
I proceed by describing briefly the discovery task and summarizing prior work on 
it. Then I present the novel finding and the circumstances that led to it, and explore 
some of the implications of this finding within the particle physics domain. Since our 
research on scientific discovery emphasizes generality within science, I examine briefly 
the generic character of this task in science generally. This note closes by summarizing 
the lessons for machine discovery. 
2. The particle physics task 
The task of postulating conservation laws from observational data on particle reactions 
was apparently first mentioned in the scientific discovery literature by Langley, Simon, 
Bradshaw, and Zytkow [ ‘21. I illustrate the task by a simple example. ’ 
Let us suppose that experiments have shown that the following reaction among parti- 
cles is observed to occur: 
Furthermore, this second reaction 
p+7T+7T” 
has never been observed (this is implied by the symbol +), despite much experimental 
effort, and despite the fact that the reaction is not ruled out by existing theory. These 
circumstances raise a quandary which calls out for resolution. 
An adequate resolution lies in postulating a new conserved property that has the value 
of unity for the particles p and n and zero for the other particles. This property is 
conserved by the observed reaction and violated by the unobserved one, which explains 
why the unobserved reaction never occurs. Historically, particle physicists have faced 
similar puzzles involving more numerous reactions and have resolved them in such a 
partially data-driven manner by postulating conserved particle properties [ 31. 
We can generalize the previous simple example into some general concepts of particle 
physics. First, a conseri&on law states that some aggregate quantity is conserved by 
a stated physical process. A phenomenological conservation law is one that is not 
discovered or justified on theoretical grounds, but instead serves as a rather ad-hoc 
explanation of observations; phenomenological reasoning in physics corresponds roughly 
to the data-driven reasoning of AI terminology. Conservation laws in particle physics 
are examples of selection rules: they select which hypothetical reactions cannot occur 
because they violate conservation; not all selection rules need be conservation laws. 
’ This example, and some other parts of this paper, are taken from previous publications in order to make 
the exposition self-contained. 
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Finally, the quantities that these conservation laws conserve are quantum numbers: 
simple, small numbers that characterize particles and which are not necessarily integers. 
3. Prior work 
Langley, Simon, Bradshaw, and Zytkow [2] were apparently the first in the AI 
literature to mention the discovery task of postulating phenomenological conservation 
laws. These authors pointed out the task’s resemblance to the task carried out by their 
DALTON program in chemistry, implying that the former task was possibly amenable 
to the heuristic search methods that DALTON used, although no specific approach was 
given. 
Kocabas [ l] was the first to describe a program BR-3 capable of performing the task; 
his BR-3 used some algebraic manipulation to reduce the initial search space, followed 
by generating specific quantum numbers for particles, testing for contradictions, and 
backtracking. Given historical data on particle reactions, BR-3 was able to re-discover 
laws such as the conservation of baryon quantum number, lepton quantum number, and 
electron and muon numbers. However, Kocabas reported that BR-3 did not find the 
accepted strangeness quantum numbers when given the reactions that led historically to 
the discovery of strangeness. 
Vald&-Perez [4] then described the PAUL1 program which uses a combination of 
linear programming and backtrack search. PAULI’s approach is based on re-representing 
the particle reactions as two sets of linear algebraic expressions,’ making use of a well- 
known technique in chemistry that I employed in another discovery program MECHEM 
[S] for reasoning about multi-step reaction pathways. PAUL1 was able to re-discover 
the strangeness quantum numbers using the historical assumptions and data available to 
Murray Gell-Mann, the co-discoverer of strangeness [ 31. 
3.1. Discrepancies between BR-3 and PAULI 
Kocabas’ paper showed how, given the reactions in our Table 1 (Kocabas’ Table 3), 
BR-3 postulates the two accepted conservation laws of baryon and lepton number shown 
in Table 2. Every observed reaction in Table 1 conserves the sum of baryon numbers; 
that is, the summed baryon numbers of the reactants equals the corresponding products 
sum. The same conservation condition holds in the case of lepton numbers. On the other 
hand, each unobserved reaction in Table 1 violates at least one of the two laws. For 
example, the reaction p --+ 7~ + y violates baryon number conservation, but not lepton 
conservation. 
On the same reactions data from Table 1, PAUL1 finds that one conservation law is 
enough to account for the observations; its quantum numbers also appear in Table 2. 
Only the three particles p, n, and Z@’ receive unit quantum numbers, whereas the 
* A EaCtiOn A + B ---t c + D that conserves some qUantity Q irt@ieS the equatiOn UQ + hQ = CQ + dQ 
whose terms are. variables rather than particles. Similarly, if the reaction fails to conserve Q, this implies the 
ifl~~UUtiO?l “Q + hQ + CQ + da. 
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Reactions giving rise to the baryon and lepton conservation laws 
Observed reactions Unobserved reactions 
1-p - p + p + 4’ P --t vi-y 
PSP - pflr+n P - n.+,O 
p+?r - p+fJ P - r+Y 
??+I’ -t ?7+p P - 7r+Q7-+?j+77”++‘) 
;ii+p - 7r” + n P+P + ;i+;i 
TT+p --) p+?T+i?+?i 
y+e --t Y+e 
r+p --4 e+P 
T” i Y+Y 
77 4 /L + zbl 
7r - LL+ ‘% 
/* - e+u,+v, 
n + p+e+v, 
Z+p - A + K” 
Table 2 
Quantum numbers for the particles 
Particle Baryon 
number 
Lepton 
number 
Particle Batyon 
number 
L.epton 
number 
P 1 0 1 v 0 -I 0 
n 1 0 I CL 0 I 0 
r 0 1 0 7i 0 -1 0 
r 0 -1 0 Y 0 0 0 
A 1 0 0 * 0 0 0 
;i -1 0 0 ?i 0 0 0 
K” 0 0 1 To 0 0 0 
lJ 0 1 0 
other particles are assigned zero. As is required of any solution, the observed reactions 
conserve PAULI’s quantum number, whereas the unobserved ones violate it. Note that 
the program’s quantum number is not a simple sum of the baryon and lepton numbers 
found by BR-3. 
To explain its input data, PAUL1 prefers fewer conservation laws, ideally a single 
law (unless there are no unobserved reactions, in which case no “selection rules” 
are needed, since there is nothing to select against). This is the primary criterion of 
simplicity in the program. Given competing explanations of the same data, e.g., two 
alternative conservation laws, PAUL1 prefers the law that involves the smaller sum 
of the absolute values of quantum numbers; this preference expresses the program’s 
secondary simplicity criterion. 
4. Some puzzles, and an explanation 
On the same input data, PAULI consistently found simpler (one-conservation-law) 
solutions than did BR-3, which was puzzling, since BR-3’s achievements were re- 
discoveries of accepted results in particle physics. Our previous explanation for this 
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puzzle [ 41 consisted of three alternatives: 
( 1) Physicists erred by proposing unnecessarily complex assignments of quantum 
numbers. 
(2) Physicists used further constraints to postulate the new quantum numbers. 
(3) PAULI’s simplicity criteria (inductive bias) are different from (and inferior to) 
the criteria used by physicists. 
The second of these alternatives was correct in the case of PAULI’s surprising con- 
clusions about strangeness. That is, on the same strangeness input data as were used 
historically, consisting of (1) observed particle reactions, and (2) unobserved particle 
reactions, PAULI’s solution was at first simpler than the solution accepted in physics. 
However, Ne’eman and Kirsh [ 31 mention a further constraint (the nucleon and pion 
families possess zero strangeness) that was not mentioned in the textbook (Omnes, 
1971) cited by Kocabas, but was assumed by Murray Gell-Mann for his discovery of 
the strangeness conservation law in 1953. When this constraint was incorporated into 
PAUL1 for the strangeness case, the program did find the accepted values of strangeness 
for the particles involved in the input reactions. This solution to the puzzle in the case 
of strangeness involved the second alternative above (i.e., physicists had used additional 
constraints), and suggested that perhaps the entire puzzle of why PAUL1 persisted in 
finding simpler solutions could be solved by recourse to the same explanation, of an 
omission of analogous constraints. Surprisingly, this suggestion turned out to be wrong 
in the general case. 
To gain further insight into this mystery, Kocabas and this author each ran his program 
on other inputs besides those in Kocabas’ original paper; PAUL1 invariably found that 
the simplest solution involved only one conservation law, despite the fact that BR-3 
would find multiple ones, and despite the fact that particle physicists had also postulated 
several conservation laws. From these observations of PAULI’s invariant behavior, I 
conjectured that, on any consistent3 reaction data whatsoever, one conservation law 
was provably sufficient to rule out the unobserved particle reactions and rule in the 
observed reactions. I turned to a colleague (Michael Erdmann) for help in proving this 
theorem, which he carried out by building on the matrix algebraic representations used 
to design PAULI. 
Theorem. For any set 0 of observed reactions and set U of unobserved reactions, at 
most one quantum number conservation law sujjices to rule out U and rule in 0. That 
is, there exists a numerical assignment to each particle appearing in the reactions such 
that every reaction in 0 conserves this number via summation, and every reaction in U 
fails to conserve it. 
We then reported these results to a physics audience [ 93 as three contributions: ( 1) an 
automation of the discovery task based on simple principles; (2) a systematic derivation 
3 Consistency means that the observed and unobserved reaction sets can in principle be distinguished using 
selection rules of conservation. If some unobserved reaction U is linearly dependent on the observed reactions 
0, then the dataset is inconsistent, because if every reaction in 0 conserves a quantum number, then U must 
dS0. 
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of the strangeness quantum numbers using historically accurate data and assumptions; 
and (3) the cited theorem on the parsimony of phenomenological conservation laws 
(i.e., one law is enough for all conceivable, consistent experimental data). 
Section 5 resumes the discussion from the viewpoint of research on scientific discov- 
ery. I now proceed to explore some of the implications of this theorem, which is not 
without interest for those concerned with the philosophy and practice of induction in 
scientific inference. 
4.1. One law versus multiple laws 
For any given input data, the single all-encompassing conservation law found by 
PAUL1 is not in general logically equivalent to the alternative multiple conservation 
laws. That is, although both theories explain the reactions data, they make discrepant 
predictions about un~eelz data. In general, each theory prohibits some reactions that the 
other theory allows, although one expects that the multiple conservation laws will be 
more restrictive, since each law serves as an independent constraint on the possible 
reactions. 
For example, Table 2 above showed two theories for the reactions of Table 1: the 
baryon/lepton numbers accepted by physicists and PAULI’s numbers. As an experiment, 
I formed all 1575 possible reactions of the form A + B + C that involve the given 
particles. Of these reactions, the baryon/lepton theory prohibits 1325 reactions and 
accepts 250, while PAULI’s theory prohibits 675 and allows 900 (as expected, the dual- 
conservation-law theory is more stringent). There are 168 reactions that are allowed 
by both theories, 593 reactions that are prohibited by both, and 814 reactions (more 
than half) on which the two theories disagree. Two examples of these 814 discordant 
reactions are: p + e + n is prohibited by the baryon/lepton theory, but not by PAULI’s 
theory, and Ka + y + IT is prohibited by PAULI, but not by baryon/lepton. 
In brief, one law and multiple law theories can make conflicting predictions on unseen 
data; they are not generally equivalent. 
4.2. A second puzzle and its resolution 
The beginning of Section 4 mentioned one puzzle: PAUL1 consistently yielded single- 
conservation-law solutions where BR-3 and particle physics practice yielded solutions 
based on multiple conservation laws. This puzzle was resolved by discovering that single 
law solutions were to be expected mathematically, so that PAULI, which is based on a 
systematic, mathematical formulation of the search space, should not find anything other 
than single laws. 
However, this mathematical resolution of the puzzle immediately raised a second 
puzzle which the closing statement in our physics article [9] expressed thus: “It might 
be worthwhile to reconcile this theorem with the multiplicity of phenomenological 
quantum properties”. In other words, what criteria could lead, under a purely data- 
driven regime, to a justi$cation of the multiple conservation laws found in particle 
physics phenomenology? 
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This latter question motivated a follow-up article [7] that examined and rejected 
two such criteria: optimism (all unseen reactions can occur) and pessimism (all unseen 
reactions are impossible) because they are easily shown to fail to provide the needed 
justification. A third, minimax criterion, according to which one seeks to minimize 
the maximum quantum number, does lead to a theoretical justification, since a single 
conservation law might involve, for example, a maximum quantum number of 3, whereas 
multiple laws might lead to a maximum quantum number of 2. However, even though 
minimax is a powerful concept in optimization, a justification of physics laws based on 
it seems somewhat esoteric and ad hoc. 
The fourth and final justification examined in the cited follow-up article leads to 
the seemingly most satisfactory resolution, and is based on the following preliminary 
observation: If the number of observed, linearly independent reactions equals or exceeds 
the number of particles, then elementary matrix algebra indicates that no conservation 
law can exist, that is, no law can rule in the observed reactions and rule out the 
unobserved ones.4 In such a case, one must either seek alternative selection rules not 
based on conservation of a quantum number, or perform divide-and-conquer. 
The divide-and-conquer approach implies dividing all the observed reactions into two 
or more groups which need not be disjoint, such that within each group, the number of 
observed reactions is less than the number of particles. One then finds a conservation 
law for each group separately. Since no single law will cover all the reactions, the result 
is that every group’s conservation law will find exceptions among some reactions outside 
that group. This is precisely the situation in particle physics practice, in which some 
reactions fail to conserve one quantum number while conserving all the others. 
The resolution of this second puzzle, then, is that one can show, via our machine 
discovery aided theorem and some further analysis, that the multiple conservation laws 
of particle physics phenomenology are mathematically necessary whenever the observed 
reactions become numerous relative to the number of particles. Curiously, this constitutes 
a top-down justification of the state reached in a partly bottom-up manner by physics 
phenomenology. 
5. Generic views of the discovery task 
Most research on scientific discovery has been concerned with the relation of discovery 
processes to general problem solving [ 21. Our recent research, in contrast, has been 
overtly preoccupied with the relation of a given discovery task to problem solving 
in science. That is, we seek generalization not within general problem solving, but 
within science [ 81. We proceed thus not from lack of ambition, but in the belief that a 
body of computationally oriented theory about science will yield different, and perhaps 
crisper, results than will an analogous theory about much broader phenomena. These 
research goals are explicated elsewhere under the organizing concept of generic task 
4 Because a matrix R of observed reactions will be nonsingular and invertible, so that the only solution to 
the equation RP = 0, where P is the matrix of particle quantum numbers, will be P = 0, which means that 
no unobserved reaction can fail to conserve the quantum number. 
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of scientific discovery [61. Previously, Valdes-Perez, Zytkow, and Simon [lo] showed 
that the current discovery task lies within a formally defined generic category that they 
called scientific model building as search in matrix spaces. Here I will analyze briefly 
some broader, but less formal, generic aspects of the discovery task. 
PAUL1 addresses the task of providing a theoretical basis to distinguish the possible 
reactions that particles undergo from the impossible reactions. In an abstract sense, this 
task is common throughout science: to find or postulate a feature that distinguishes two 
classes of objects. For example, a developmental biologist searches for developmental 
characteristics that distinguish a mutant organism from the wild-type (normal) organism. 
A psychiatrist looks for eye-movement patterns that discriminate between psychotics and 
normal subjects. A physiologist seeks features to classify diseased and healthy cells. All 
of these tasks are somewhat analogous to the concept learning task in machine learn- 
ing. However, all these scientific tasks emphasize finding or postulating discriminatory 
features rather than selecting from a known list. 
As in concept learning, a correct but uninteresting theoretical explanation of the 
observed and unobserved reactions consists of a trivial disjunction of the observed re- 
actions, meaning that all other reactions are prohibited. A more interesting and use- 
ful partial explanation was attempted by the physicist Abraham Pais, who pointed 
out that, for the reactions that led to the discovery of strangeness, particles are gen- 
erally produced in pairs and never as single particles [3]. This observational pat- 
tern of associated production could serve as a partial discriminating feature between 
possible and impossible reactions. However, particle .physicists eventually followed 
a more theoretical and complete approach by postulating unseen, conserved proper- 
ties (quantum numbers) such that any hypothetical reaction that violated conservation 
was deemed impossible. This approach is, of course, the one followed by BR-3 and 
PAULI. 
So, although the task of inventing features to discriminate between two classes is 
broadly generic throughout science, the detailed solution strategies may be highly par- 
ticular, as in the approach followed by particle physics in this case. 
6. Lessons 
The lesson of this paper for artificial intelligence is that machine discovery based on 
heuristic search does lead to new findings in science, even in sciences of such celebrity 
and theory density as particle physics. In this instance, the new finding is a theorem 
which was enabled by machine discovery in the sense that observations of the invariant 
behavior of a machine discovery program directly led to the theorem’s conjecture; its 
proof used representational techniques borrowed from the design of the program itself. 
Follow-up work then addressed-and resolved- the question of why physics practice 
seemingly conflicts with the theorem. 
It is important to document such results for AI audiences, in order to falsify the 
premise of an otherwise powerful argument: a dearth of machine discoveries implies 
that machine discovery research is not addressing the essential parts of the discovery 
process in science. 
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